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PRIVATE REASON (S) AND PUBLIC SPHERES: 
SEXUALITY AND ENLIGHTENMENT IN KANT 
Thomas Paul Bonfiglio 
Pivoting on the essay on enlightenment as a central text and refer- 
ring to other thematically relevant writings by Kant, this study qualifies 
the view that the Kantian concepts of enlightenment and the public 
sphere are represented solely in a neutral,1 disinterested manner as 
open and democratic forums for all men and women.2 By recovering 
unconscious inscriptions of gender, sexuality, and class in contradis- 
tinction to the dominant "democratic" reception of Kant, this essay 
shows how infrastructural sexual dynamics co-articulate the surface 
discourses of enlightenment, the public and private spheres, and the 
beautiful and the sublime. As non-cognitive structures, these discourses 
inscribe corporophobia, orality, and paranoia, as well as a particular 
interplay between the heterosocial and the homosocial. While not 
minimizing Kant's contribution to a liberal, critical democracy, one 
can show that Kant's writings and their receptions are also unwitting 
missionaries of some complex counter-enlightenment tendencies. 
First, it is important to note that Kant's essay on enlightenment is 
framed not as a question, but as an answer. Many English editions3 
overlook the complete title, which is "Beantwortung der Frage: Was 
ist Aufklärung?"4 Beantwortung is a perfective substantivization of the 
verb antworten (to answer) and indicates a completed process. In spite 
of Nisbet's5 appropriate translation "Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?", the essay is conventionally referred to only as "What 
is Enlightenment?",6 which is solely interrogative, gives an impression 
of indeterminacy and openness, and lacks the categoricality and final- 
ity of the complete German title. This omission has led Foucault7 and 
McCarthy8 to read the essay as an instance of difference instead of an 
axiomatic definition that attempts to preempt alterity and operate a 
priori from a position of closure. 
The answer to the question is: Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen 
aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit [Enlightenment is the escape 
from self-imposed immaturity] (8:35). The ostensible argument in 
Kant's essay is that humans are afraid to use their own faculties [der 
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Verstand] (8:35) and to think for themselves. They are responsible for 
their own prolonged state of immaturity, which is maintained by their 
own lack of courage. Thus Kant exhorts his readers to dare to think 
independently and challenge accepted norms. Although the text in- 
itially defines enlightenment, it becomes immediately preoccupied 
with a prolonged and vigorous critique of unenlightenment, describ- 
ing it as a self-imposed condition of debt and guilt, which is visible in 
the compound selbstverschuldet .9 Unenlightenment is signed as a state 
of punitive internment, a sort of debtor's prison for those who lack in- 
tellectually independent means, a locus that serves as a nodal point, 
a common denominator for some very interesting unwanted ele- 
ments. Unenlightenment is a state of Faulheit [laziness/rottenness] 
and Feigheit [cowardice] (8:35) , a place for lazy cowards that contains 
organic echoes. Also, "das ganze schöne Geschlecht" [the entire beau- 
tiful sex] (8:35) is afraid of becoming enlightened. This reference re- 
calls Kanťs writings on the beautiful and the sublime and is immediately 
followed by a description of the unenlightened as Hausvieh [domestic 
cattle] who are confined in a Gängelwagen [cattle cart] (8:35) and com- 
pared to preambulatory children. The restrictiveness of this condition 
is indicated by metaphors of terrestrial gravity, foot-shackles, and 
yokes. Thus the cowardly, feminine, beautiful, organic, zoological, im- 
mature, and infantile are conflated and condensed into the prison house 
of unenlightenment; the escape [Ausgang] is attained by a Sprung 
[leap] of frder Bewegung [free motion] (8:35). Man is to spring himself 
from his own detainment in undesirable elements, independently, 
into free space. The text is quite ambiguous about the appropriateness 
of a transition to enlightenment for these undesirable elements; they 
constitute a separate class and cohere about a nuclear conflation of 
the organic and the feminine, which are represented as contaminants. 
The Evolution of (Un) enlightenment 
Kant credits Frederick the Great with an unprecedented propaga- 
tion of enlightenment (8:41) . He can say "was ein Freistaat nicht wagen 
darf: räsoniert, so viel ihr wollt und worüber ihr wollt, nur gehorcht! 
* 
[what no democratic state would dare say: argue as much as you want 
and about whatever you want, just obey!] (8:41) . This invocation of ab- 
solutism indicates a desire to control the masses, expressed in the 
paradox that less freedom means more freedom: 
Ein großer Grad bürgerlicher Freiheit scheint der Freiheit des Geistes des Volks 
vorteilhaft und setzt ihr doch unübersteigliche S ranken; ein Grad weniger von 
jener verschafft hingegen diesem Raum, sich nach allem seinen Vermögen 
auszubreiten. [A generous degree of civil freedom appears to be advantageous to 
the intellectual freedom ofthe people; it creates, however, insurmountable o sta- 
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cles; a little less freedom, however, actually provides the space to expand to one's 
fullest potential.] (8:41) 
This statement is apparently benevolent and democratic. It is, how- 
ever, a gentle gambit in the creation of a superior space for the 
philosopher and in the restriction of certain segments of the popu- 
lation from intellectual autonomy.10 The paradox is continued so 
that the restriction appears to be a form of nurturing, which is 
configured as an organic analogy based upon the metaphor of Hülle 
und Keim: "Wenn die Natur unter dieser harten Hülle den Keim, fur 
den sie am zärtlichsten sorgt, nämlich den Hang und Beruf zum 
freien Denken, ausgewickelt hat; so wirkt dieser allmählich zurück 
auf die Sinnesart des Volks" [When nature has, under this hard hull, 
developed the germ for which she most tenderly cares, namely the 
need and profession of free thought, this will have an effect, in turn, 
on the sensibility of the people] (8:41 ) . Hülle [hull] may also be used 
with Samen [seed] or Kern [kernel], which would indicate the poten- 
tiality, but not the actuality, of growth. While also containing, in the 
eighteenth century, the above meanings, Keim had, and still has, 
primarily the meanings of germ and sprout (as in bean sprout)}1 
signifying that which is actively germinating and breaking out of its 
own (private) sphere. While ostensibly protecting the development 
of the germ, legislation checks the spread of contaminating unen- 
lightenment and isolates it from the public sphere. Although an 
organic analogy is used here to rationalize social stratification, 
Kant's own realm of reason and enlightenment is not subject to 
natural organic law, nor can it even have any cognition thereof. The 
course of enlightenment for the unenlightened, however, is sup- 
posed to proceed by natural process. It is important here to note 
that the relationship between the subject and the contaminating is 
never one of simple rejection. Stallybrass and White have noted that: 
"disgust always bears the imprint of desire. These low domains, 
apparently expelled as 'Other,' return as the object of nostalgia, 
longing, and fascination."12 "What starts as a simple repulsion or 
rejection of symbolic matter foreign to the self inaugurates a process 
of introjection and negation which is always complex in its effects."13 
For Kant, these low domains contain nature and woman14 and the 
masses, which are conflated in complex loci of interplay of cathexes 
and countercathexes. One such major locus is evolutionary theory, 
which serves as a nodal point, a vortex of engulfment that is replicated 
in numerous displacements throughout Kant's corpus. In his Recen- 
sionen von I. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte d r Menschheit 
[Review of Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind] (8:43- 
66), Kant engages Herder's organicist philosophy and reveals himself 
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as an antievolutionist.15 The following passage is a periphrastic ritique 
of Herder's notion of the common origin of all life forms: 
Nur eine Verwandtschaft unter ihnen, da entweder ine Gattung aus der anderen 
und alle aus einer einzigen Originalgattung oder etwa us einem einzigen er- 
zeugenden Mutterschooße entsprungen wären, würde auf Ideen führen, die so 
ungeheuer sind, daß die Vernunft vor ihnen zurückbebt. [One sole underlying 
relationship, that either one species should have emerged from another and all 
from a single proto-species or supposedly from a single reproductive mother's lap, 
would lead to ideas that are so monstrous, that reason would tremble back from 
them.] (8:54) 
In this passage, evolution is informed by a root gynophobia that is 
transcoded into images of a monstrous womb and situated in binary 
opposition to reason, the privileged, but threatened, entity on the 
axis. The topology of the image narrates from references to species 
downward to the node of the womb and then recoils in the image 
of reason. Fear and trembling are later repeated in an apology for 
"noch eine eben nicht unmännliche Furcht, nämlich von allem 
zurückzubeben, was die Vernunft von ihren ersten Grundsätzen 
abspannt und ihr es erlaubt macht, in grenzlosen Einbildungen 
herumzuschweifen" [a not altogether unmanly fear that makes me 
tremble back from anything that unhitches reason from its first 
principles and lets it wander about in borderless imaginings] (8:180). 
Invoking masculinity is here preemptive and implies suspicion in 
the (male) reader, a form of paranoid projection that only mirrors the 
narrator's autointerrogation. The opposition of reason and womb also 
informs Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte [Conjectural Begin- 
ning of Human History ] (8:107-124), which describes the ultimate step 
in the development of reason as "die Entlassung desselben aus dem 
Mutterschooße der Natur" [its release from the mother's lap of nature] 
(8:114). Privileging autonomy and isolation, these texts abhor both 
maternal connection and interconnection with other species and are 
thus vertically and horizontally antifamilial. 
Kant's resistance to evolutionary theory is visible again in Uber den 
Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie [On the Use of Teleologi- 
ci Prináples in Philosophy] (8:157-84), in which he critiques Forster's 
essay Noch etwas über die Menschenraßen [More on the Human Races].16 
Kant speculates that "eine philosophische Jury von bloßen Naturfor- 
schern" [a philosophical jury just of natural scientists] (8:179) would 
disapprove of the following "passage" from Forster, which is presented 
as a quotation: 
"Die kreißende Erde (S. 80) , welche Thiere und Pflanzen ohne Zeugung von ihres 
gleichen aus ihrem weichen, vom Meeresschlamme befruchteten Mutterschooße 
entspringen ließ, die darauf gegründete Lokalzeugungen organischer Gattungen, 
da Afrika seine Menschen (die Neger), Asien die seinige (alle übrige) hervor- 
brachte (S. 158), die davon abgeleitete Verwandtschaft Aller in einer unmerk- 
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lichen Abstufung vom Menschen zum Wallfische (S. 77) und so weiter hinab 
(vermuthlich bis zu Moosen und Flechten, icht blos im Vergleichungssystem, 
sondern im Erzeugungssystem aus gemeinschaftlichem Sta me) gehenden 
Naturkette organischer Wesen." [The earth in labor pains, letting plants and 
animals, without generation from the like, spring forth from her soft mother's lap 
fertilized by the sea slime, the local generation of organic species based on this, 
since Africa produced its humans (Negroes) Asia its own (all the rest) , the deduced 
relationship of everything i  unnoticeable gradations i  a natural chain of organic 
life going from humans to whales and so on down (presumably to mosses and 
lichens, not just comparatively, but also in generation from a common stem) "] 
(8:179-80). 
It is evident from the parenthetical page references that Kant is 
patching together a statement by Forster. While Lovejoy17 has al- 
ready documented Kant's misrepresentation of Forster, pointing 
out that Kant even confused his own statements about Herder with 
Forster's ideas, it is beneficial here to examine more closely how 
Kant constructed this misrepresentation. Kant seems to be accusing 
Forster of believing that all organic life (including humans) is 
interrelated and derived from simple cellular organisms, and that 
this process began in a parthenogenetic, spontaneous, and uncon- 
trolled manner. 
Forster's real text actually criticizes notions of the common origins 
of species: 
Allein in diesem Sinne dürfte die Naturgeschichte wohl nur eine Wissenschaft für
Götter und nicht für Menschen seyn. Wer ist vermögend den Stammbaum auch 
nur einer einzigen Varietät bis zu ihrer Gattung hinauf darzulegen, wenn sie nicht 
etwa erst unter unsern Augen aus einer andern entstand? Wer hat die kreißende 
Erde betrachtet in jenem entfernten und ganz in Unbegreiflichkeit verschleyerten 
Zeitpunkt, da Thiere und Pflanzen ihrem Schooße in vieler Myriaden Mannigfal- 
tigkeit entsproßen, ohne Zeugung von ihres Gleichen, ohne Samengehäuse, ohne 
Gebärmutter? Wer hat die Zahl ihrer ursprünglichen Gattungen, ihrer Auto- 
chtonen, gezählt? Wer kann uns berichten, wie viele Einzelne von jeder Gestalt, in
ganz verschiedenen Weltgegenden sich aus der gebärenden Mutter weichem, vom 
Meere befruchteten Schlamm organisierten? [I  this ense natural history would 
have to be a science only for gods, not for humans. Who is capable of laying out a 
tree diagram of even one single variety back to its species, if it did not emerge from 
another one right under our eyes? Who has seen the earth in labor pains at that 
far off point in time covered in incomprehensibility, when animals and plants 
sprouted from her lap in myriad diversity, without generation from the like, without 
seeds, without wombs? Who has counted the number of her original species, of her 
autochthons? Who can tell us how many single species organized themselves in 
totally different areas of the world out of the birthing mother's soft earth fertilized 
by the sea?]18 
One readily sees that Forster is actually quite skeptical about total- 
izing and reductionistic evolutionary theories. Kant's misreading 
suppresses Forster's irony and transforms his skepticism in to an 
advocacy of that which Forster actually critiques. 
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This is also the case in the references to whales, appropriated from 
another textual place, in which Forster is not expressing his own theo- 
ries but is actually distancing himself instead from Camper's ideas on 
comparative morphology: "Camper, der als Physiolog, und von so 
vielen andern Seiten groß und liebenswürdig ist, zeigte mir in einem 
seiner Briefe, an einem Theile des Körpers, den Füßen, wie sorgfältig 
die Analogie der Bildung durch alle Säugetiere hindurch bis auf die 
Wallfische beobachtet ist" [Camper, who, as a physiologist, and in so 
many other ways is really great and nice, showed me, in one of his let- 
ters, and based on one part of the body, the feet, how carefully the 
analogy of formation is seen through all mammals right up to the 
whales].19 Forster is actually being benignly patronizing to Camper 
and does not readily accept, as Kant would have us believe, that the 
morphological similarity between humans and whales is due to some 
form of shared phylogeny. 
In the case of interrelationships among various manifestations of 
homo , Forster says: "Ob nun aber der Neger und der Weisse, als Gat- 
tungen (species) oder nur als Varietäten von einander verschieden sind, 
ist eine schwere, vielleicht unauflösliche Aufgabe. Mit dem Schwerdt 
drein zu schlagen, überläßt der kaltblütige Forscher denen, die nicht 
anders lösen können, und doch alles lösen wollen" [Whether the Ne- 
gro and the White are different from one another as species or as va- 
rieties, is a difficult, perhaps insoluble task. The cold-blooded 
researcher leaves whacking away at it with a sword to those who cannot 
solve things any other way but still want to solve everything].20 Here, 
Forster is quite dubious of generalizations even about types of hu- 
mans. In Forster, Kant is actually confronted with a standpoint on com- 
mon evolution that is not very different from his own, i.e. that these 
hypotheses exceed the limits of science and the conventions of verifi- 
ability. Imagining a ubiquity of threat, Kant's resistance to evolution 
resembles a paranoid delusion that inverts agreement into disagree- 
ment and renarrates accord into opposition. Here, Kant's use of quo- 
tation marks does not report, but rather impersonates other voices to 
the point of caricature. 
Kant's reconstruction of Forster conflates femininity and nature to 
Baconian proportions. The antinatal passage thinly transcodes the 
woman wailing in labor into an abhorrence of natural evolution, de- 
picts the womb as structurally weak, and represents conception as con- 
tamination, as it is Schlamm [slime/mud] that is the inseminator. The 
male progenitor is absent; the process is parthenogenetic, inde- 
pendent of men, defective. The feminine is promiscuous and indiscrimi- 
nate, letting things spring forth from any sort of self-insemination. 
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Kant chooses the trope Mutterschoß [mother's lap] - Forster does 
not - for womb instead of the less allusive and more common Gebär- 
mutter [womb] , which is used by Forster along with its figurative variant 
"der gebärenden Mutter" [the birthing mother]. The repetitive sub- 
stitution of the figure Mutterschoß should arouse the suspicions of most 
audient readers of Kant. It acts as a condensation annexing the seman- 
tic fields of maternity, maternality, intimacy, security, and domestic 
education and serves as a sliding signifier along the métonymie chain 
of feminine substitutions, aided by the alliterative and metric connec- 
tions between Mutterschooße and Meeresschlamme [s a slime] and by 
their close textual proximity as well. Both are trochaic dimeters, 
rhyme in the last unstressed syllable, and alliterate initially and me- 
dially. This structural repetition connects Mutter [mother] with Meer 
[sea] and Schoß [lap] with Schlamm [slime], facilitated by the internal 
alveolo-palatal fricative [sch], which acts as a sonic correlate for the 
meanings of soft, mushy, and undefined. The passage also repeats re- 
sistance to interconnectedness. It is interesting to note the different 
vocal tones that frame the feminine allusions: those of Kant seem dis- 
missive, those of Forster benignly inquisitive. 
Unenlightenment and Orality 
Corporophobia privileges the visual sense above the others: hence 
the visual metaphors in the English enlightenment, the French lumières, as 
well as in the German Aufklärung, literally a clearing up. In Kant's An- 
thropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht [Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View] (7: 1 17-334) , sight is the noblest of the senses because it is most 
removed from touch, the most restricted of perceptions (7:156), and 
approaches the status of a pure observation. Smell is the most impos- 
ing sense, disturbs at a great distance, and opposes personal freedom 
("der Freiheit zuwider") (7:158). Interestingly, Kant presents smell, 
the most unsublimated and immediate sense, in opposition to freedom. 
Smell and taste, the second most objectionable sense, are placed in 
the category of the more subjective senses, offering little epistemologi- 
ca! or empirical objective worth (7:154). 
Kant locates the two deprivileged "subjective" senses in the olfactory/ 
oral complex, which regulates ingestion. His taxonomy of the senses 
privileges the ocular and deprivileges the oral and, by association, the 
oral stage, which signifies the primary and most dependent phase, the 
first instance of alterity, and the necessity of individuation. Identified 
with maternal dependency, this stage represents, from a certain mas- 
culinist perspective, the most threatening instance of regression. The 
attainment of (male) enlightenment is configured in greatest oppo- 
sition to oral dependency. 
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Auflilärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten 
Unmündigst [Enlightenment is the escape from self-imposed imma- 
turity] . The binary structure is clear: enlightenment is the escape from 
the term Unmündigkeit [ mmaturity] , a substantivization of the adjec- 
tive unmündig [immature], which designates a minor. Although ety- 
mologically distinct, the word alliterates with der Mund [mouth] and 
resonates of an inability to speak.21 The enlightenment essay direcdy 
represents the state of unenlightenment nineteen times by lexical 
choices that play negatively on the term Mund. The oral thus stands 
in opposition to the enlightened subject, not only in the terms un- 
mündig/Unmündigkeit, but also in the term Vormünder [guardians] , 
those who speak for and before the unenlightened, and upon whom 
one is (orally) dependent for the articulation of thought.22 Anathema 
to male autonomy, unenlightenment is a state of inarticulateness, in- 
sufficiency, and dependency upon authority, characteristics intercon- 
nected via the condensation Mund , a repetitive metonym of hostility 
toward oral and maternal dependency that also carries antifamilial 
traces in the negative usage of minor and guardian . 
In the same essay, the description of unenlightenment via oral meta- 
phors frames the discussion of the public sphere, which privileges the 
unbound male scholar and omits references to the oral; they cease as 
the discussion begins and reappear as the discussion ends. The last 
oral reference before the discussion of the public sphere and the first 
oral reference thereafter act as parallel bookends that discuss the 
paradoxical situation that the Vormünder [guardians] should them- 
selves remain unmündig [immature] ,23 Interestingly, the prefatory ref- 
erence also presents an image of jettisoning the yoke of Unmündigkeit 
("das Joch der Unmündigkeit selbst abgeworfen") (8:36) imposed by 
the Vormünder, while simultaneously warning - against revolution - 
that a people can only attain enlightenment gradually. It is as if the 
philosopher unbound jettisons both the yoke of Unmündigkeit and the 
yoke of the masses and then moves freely in the public sphere, which 
is not an oral but a literary sphere. Kant says that the public use of rea- 
son is performed by a "Gelehrter . . . vor dem ganzen Publikum der 
Leserwelt" [scholar before the entire public of the literate world] 
(8:37). This is not the public, but the published use of reason.24 
The Feminine Beautiful and the Masculine Sublime 
In saying that women are unenlightened, Kant refers to them as das 
ganze schöne Geschlecht [the entire beautiful sex] (8:35), the same 
phrase that begins the third section of the Beobachtungen über das Gefühl 
des Schönen und Erhabenen [ Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
the Sublime ] (2:205-56), which bifurcates beauty and sublimity along 
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the lines of femininity and masculinity respectively.25 Characterizing 
this early work as "precriticar and skipping to the aesthetic discussions 
in the Kritik der Urteilskraft [Critique of Judgment] (5:165-486) are com- 
mon gambits in the canonization of Kant, blotting the continuity of 
gendered discourse in Kant's opus. 
A recent instance of blindness and gendering can be found in Paul 
de Man's26 treatment of Kant's discussion of the sublime, which fo- 
cuses exclusively on the Critique of Judgment. De Man's perspective is 
clearly poststructural and language-oriented, and he leaves unread 
the inscriptions of masculinity in Kant's aesthetics. He makes only one 
glib reference to the Observations and says that Kant's inclusion of gen- 
der in aesthetic concepts makes for "difficult reading."27 Indeed, the 
entire problem lies in reading an sich : "The bottom line in Kant as well 
as in Hegel, is the prosaic materiality of the letter and no degree of 
obfuscation or ideology can transform this materiality into phenome- 
nal cognition of aesthetic judgement."28 De Man also asserts "how de- 
cisively determining the play of the letter and of the syllable, the way 
of saying ... as opposed to what is being said ... is in this most un- 
conspicuous of stylists."29 De Man does indeed aptly reveal the linguis- 
tic inability of the text to represent the noumenality of the sublime. 
The victor in this struggle is the medium of language, which writes it- 
self as much as it is written. De Man's reading suppresses the possibility 
that the representation of the sublime in Kant is not only thwarted by 
the resistant materiality of language alone, but also by other supressed 
agendas that are competing for representation. In a sensitive reading, 
the lexical field is interrupted by these other resonances. The problem 
is not only linguistically unrepresentable mystification alone, but also 
an ideology of gender that interferes with the course of the narrative. 
A good example of this can be found in the following passage from 
the Critique of Judgment that de Man examines: "If we are to call the 
sight of the ocean sublime, we must not think of it as we ordinarily do, 
as implying all kinds of knowledge ... as a vast kingdom of aquatic 
creatures ... all these produce merely teleological judgments. To find 
the ocean nevertheless sublime we must regard it as the poets do, 
merely by what the eye reveals [was der Augenschein zeigt] . If it is at 
rest, as a clear mirror of water only bounded by the heavens; if it is 
stormy, as an abyss threatening to overwhelm everything."30 The emo- 
tionally threatened description of the ocean seems to be a contradic- 
tion here. It is, by definition, supposed to be sublime and, therefore, 
transcendental and non-experiential. How is the reader to reconcile 
disinterested visual perception with an overwhelming fear of engulf- 
ment? Is the eruptive presence of the fear of engulfment to be under- 
stood as a mere spasm of language? Or of a vocal spasm indicating that 
180 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
other, perhaps phobic voices are trying to speak here as well?31 Fol- 
lowing these voices leads one to a locus of fear that conflates nature 
and woman. It also leads one to see how Kant's discourse of the aes- 
thetic encodes the containment, regulation, and public restriction of 
the feminine (body) .32 
The third section of the Observations concerns the nature of the sub- 
lime and the beautiful in heterosexual interaction. It is framed as a 
tract on gender equality that laudably discourages authoritarianism 
(2:242) and advocates behavioral androgyny (2:228). It also, however, 
and somewhat paradoxically, asserts that man and woman are not of 
one kind ("nicht von einerlei Art") (2:228) but are two separate spe- 
cies of human ("zwei Menschengattungen") (2:228). The anatomy of 
difference in the body of the text distributes conjugal energies accord- 
ingly. (Feminine) beauty displays Leichtigkeit [ease] and the absence 
of peinliche Bemühung [uncomfortable effort] . Women have "nichts von 
sollen, nichts von müssen, nichts von Schuldigkeit" [nothing of ought, 
nothing of must, nothing of guilt] (2:231) . They lack self-control, de- 
cisiveness, and a militaristic notion of duty. The masculine sublime, 
striving and overcoming obstacles, elicits Bewunderung [wonder/admira- 
tion] . This sublime consists in a continual repression and sublimation 
of the sensual. It is distanced from the sensual complex and rests in a su- 
perordinate position of control, standardizing the sensual manifold as 
if a commodity of exchange. Kant holds that "die schöne Gestalt . . . 
von allen Männern ziemlich gleichförmig beurtheilt werde" [the beau- 
tiful form is judged rather uniformly by all men] (2:237). These are 
general principles of the perception of beauty, a notion of de gustibus 
non disputandum est , not because one cannot ultimately decide on 
taste, but because a uniformity of opinion makes discussion unneces- 
sary. Commodification is displayed in the example of Circassian and 
Georgian girls, who are uniformly held to be beautiful, especially by 
Turks, Arabs, and Persians, "weil sie sehr begierig sind, ihre Völkerschaft 
durch so feines Blut zu verschönern" [because they are so desirous of 
beautifying their stock by such fine blood] (2:237) . This corporealizes 
and commodities the feminine as a means of breeding. Hindustani 
merchants engage in the trade of these women33 and procure them 
for wealthy men in their native country (2:237-38). This discourse of 
the sublime, anticipating the specter of the spontaneously generating 
mother in the Anthropology , transcodes the phobic into a structure of 
nonlocal abstract perceptions and configures the feminine as a gen- 
eral (izable) commodity that ought not possess a deregulated ontology 
and thus access to a form of spontaneous action or generation. In addi- 
tion, the separation of woman as another species of human more boldly 
underscores the aforementioned fear of connection with other species. 
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When this discourse leaves the standardized realm of beauty and 
crosses over into perceptions of morality in the feminine visage, it then 
becomes relative: "So ist der Geschmack bei verschiedensten Mannsper- 
sonen jederzeit sehr verschieden" [Here, taste is always very different 
for the most diverse of manly persons] (2:237) . Thus the feminine be- 
comes de-moralized, and questions of morality an object of diverse male 
perception and public debate. Unlike beauty, morality is not intrinsic 
to the feminine: it occurs in the forum of male opinion and cognition 
and is thus safe for deregulation in the public sphere. (Feminine) 
morality is an instance of doubt, skepticism, and distanced non- 
threatening debate. (Feminine) beauty is an instance of threat that is 
to be regulated, standardized, and restricted from free permutation. 
Paranoia and the Public Sphere 
The section of the Anthropology entitled "Der Charakter des 
Geschlechts" [The Character of the Sexes] (7:303-11), often cited in 
feminist critiques of Kant, has yet to be read for its examples of mecha- 
nisms of displacement and denial and for its protracted discussion of 
jealousy and flirtation within its patriarchal project. A reading ori- 
ented toward these phenomena can offer insight into concepts central 
to the discussion of enlightenment. 
Kant begins the essay with the surprising view that feminine, more 
than masculine, behavior is the proper object of anthropological study 
for the philosopher. Jauch34 admirably delineates the ideology of this 
utterance: because of his physical superiority in the state of nature, 
man already possesses an articulated self. Woman, however, needs to 
develop an articulated self and is to do so via the media of art and cul- 
ture. Thus Kant's statements about woman are descriptive and didac- 
tic and intend an egalitarian feminine individuation. Jauch does not 
observe that this is, however, a tutorial individuation, a form of 
planned rather than independent enlightenment that paradoxically 
configures the individuating woman in a state of Unmündigkeit. Thus 
there are vestiges of authority in this prescribed separate but equal state. 
The text configures sexuality as binary, involving reciprocal domi- 
nation and subjugation ("ein Theil mußte dem anderen unterworfen 
und wechselseitig einer dem andern irgendwohin überlegen sein") 
(7:303). Woman's natural function is to master the man's drive ("sich 
der Neigung des Mannes zu ihr zu bemeistern") (7:303), and femi- 
nine weaknesses are among the few tools that woman has to guide mas- 
culinity and use it to her advantage ("die Männlichkeit zu lenken und 
sie zu jener ihrer Absicht zu gebrauchen") (7:303). Her only theater 
of action is the home, where she holds a "Regiment" (7:304) and wages 
domestic war with her tongue ("den Hauskrieg mit der Zunge") 
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(7:304). This apology for female aggression serves to vindicate male 
authority. He has "das Recht des Stärkeren" [the right of the stronger 
one] (7:304) and the right to use his strength, because woman can ren- 
der him disarmed ("entwaffnet") and defenseless ("wehrlos"). Thus, 
in preemptive defense, he assumes the authoritative position. Other- 
wise, she will pursue her self-interested goal of dominating the entire 
species ("die Eroberung des ganzen Geschlechts") (7:305). 
It is precisely this representation of woman, however, that amplifies 
some muted counter-democratic voices. Oppressive urges, generated 
by the indeterminacies of sexuality and repressed by the censorship 
of a democratic morality, are transformed into euphemized justifica- 
tions of hierarchical order: "Wer soll dann den oberen Befehl im Hause 
haben? . . . Die Frau soll herrschen und der Mann regieren; denn die 
Neigung herrscht, und der Verstand regiert" [Who should have the 
high command at home? . . . The woman should rule and the man 
should govern; for bias rules, and intelligence governs] (7:304) . This 
invokes egalitarian rhetoric, but it also simultaneously validates male 
dominance. The transformation displaces the problem into political 
discourse and then obscures the element of servitude by foreground- 
ing the image of egalitarianism. The inversion allows the primitive dy- 
namic to slip in undercover, detected subliminally but not superficially. 
A similar occasion of communication via displacement and denial 
is found in a gratuitous anecdote that is ostensibly intended to illus- 
trate the function of jealousy. The anecdote appears as a footnote and 
requires closer scrutiny: 
Die alte Sage von den Russen: daß die Weiber ihre Ehemänner imVerdacht ielten, 
es mit anderen Weibern zu halten, wenn sie nicht dann und wann von diesen 
Schläge bekommen, wird gewöhnlich für Fabel gehalten. Allein in Cooks Reisen 
findet man: daß, als ein englischer Matrose einen Indier auf Otaheite sein Weib 
mit Schlägen züchtigen sah, jener den Gallanten machen wollte und mit Drohun- 
gen auf diesen losging. Das Weib kehrte sich auf der Stelle wider den Engländer, 
fragte, was ihm das angehe: der Mann müsse das thun! [The old tale about he 
Russians: that they suspect their husbands of fooling around unless they get hit by 
them every now and then, is usually held to be a myth. But in Cook's travels one 
finds: that, when an English sailor saw an Indian in Tahiti disciplining his wife with 
blows, he wanted to play the gallant gendeman and went after him with threats. 
The wife turned on the spot against the Englishman and asked him what business 
it was of his: this is what husbands are supposed to do!] (7:304) 
Marginalized as a footnote, distanced from the center of discourse, 
and transformed into a joke, this multi-layered passage effects, on 
an unconscious level, an affirmative representation of spousal 
abuse. In Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious ,35 Freud demonstrated 
the triadic technique of jokes that involves a narrator, an audience, 
and an outsider. Narrator and audience share a hostile attitude 
toward the outsider that is subject to mechanisms of repression, 
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censorship, and guilt. The pleasure of the joke is gained through 
the lifting of censorship by the techniques of displacement and 
condensation. 
This joke dialogues between the narrator and a projected male Ger- 
man audience whose shared unconscious hostility toward the femi- 
nine is checked by socio-political codes of gentlemanliness and 
egalitarianism. The repression involved evokes primitive violent reac- 
tive mechanisms that must be sufficiently transformed so as to evade 
censorship, and it is the unnoticed evasion that catalyzes the pleasur- 
able reaction. Here, the dissimulating transformations interpolate dis- 
placement and denial. The initial displacement from Germans to 
Russians is itself a denial: we do not do this; the Russians do. This is 
followed by another denial: the Russians do not really do this either; 
it is merely a myth. Russia thus offers a convenient contiguous meto- 
nym for the displacement. The next displacement, which bears the af- 
firmation, is to Tahiti, horizontally farther and vertically lower on a 
Eurocentric scale of civilization. The real outsider here is the ethical 
code that censors violence. The feminine is the appropriated other, 
common property of narrator and audience. The English gentleman, 
precoded for a Western sense of propriety, becomes the fool who is 
fooled by the appearance of impropriety. The comic moment expels 
the ethical censor, diffuses censorship, and validates hostility by intro- 
ducing the desired figure of the servile woman. 
This hostility toward the feminine is an unwitting reaction to the in- 
determinacies of sexuality, which engender anxieties that inform the 
Anthropology and its representation of the feminine as indiscriminately 
sexual and, therefore, to be regulated. In sexual matters, the male has 
a self-contained notion of taste ("Geschmack für sich"), but the 
woman makes herself the object of taste for everyone (7:308) . In mar- 
riage, the man woos only his wife, but the wife seeks the attention of 
all men ("aller Manner Neigung") (7:307). Men are jealous only when 
in love, but women are always jealous, preferring a large circle of suit- 
ors ("Anbeter") . The male is principled and discreet, while the woman 
is unprincipled and promiscuous. Heterosocial communication is pre- 
sented as an innocent contact for the man but a sexually charged liai- 
son for the woman. These representations of the feminine as erotic, 
indiscriminate, conspiratorial, and domineering indicate the infra- 
structure of a basic paranoid delusion. 
In Freud's description of heteroerotic and homoerotic male para- 
noid jealousy,36 the paranoiac represses his own erotic urges, project- 
ing them instead onto his partner. The desire for heterosexual 
transgression is transformed into the perception of the partner's flir- 
tation with other men and thereby justified: she is flirting with other 
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men, therefore I may flirt with other women. Heteroerotic paranoid 
jealousy involves reference to one's own indiscretions and (het- 
ero) erotic inclinations. Homoerotic paranoid jealousy, however, fully 
denies one's own erotic urges: it is not I who loves him, it is she. Here, 
projection and denial censor and repress homoerotic impulses. 
Exploring homoerotic paranoid jealousy in Kant, Monique David- 
Ménard37 extrapolates from this paranoia to Kant's solutions to prob- 
lems of objectivity and reference. Her discussion focuses on the 
second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, which examines insoluble ar- 
guments between antinomies and shows that it is rationally impossible 
to choose one side or the other. The example cited in Kant involves 
the antinomy of determinism vs. free will and holds that neither 
proposition is capable of defining itself without reference to and ne- 
gation of the other. Each side represses cognition of its own presup- 
positions and concentrates instead on the presuppositions that the 
other one overlooks. In this conflict, reason itself reaches a decisional 
impasse. David-Ménard then makes analogical connections to the be- 
havior of paranoiacs, who are blind to their own projections and 
acutely preoccupied with the unfalsifiable motivations of the despised 
other. Just as the paranoiac refers to the other and not to the self, so 
do thesis and antithesis suppress self-reference. Just as the paranoiac 
claims that the other is unaware of unconscious motivations, so do the- 
sis and antithesis claim that the other is unaware of the foundational 
problems in the argument. Just as the paranoid mentality exists vis-à- 
vis the projected other as object of hate, so are thesis and antithesis 
incapable of autonomous justification. And, just as paranoia can be 
seen as a transformation of an underlying sexual problematic, so can 
this idiom of antinomical reasoning be viewed as sexually generated. 
David-Ménard thus sees this philosophical system as a transformation 
of male homoerotic sexuality, as "la transformation de l'ho- 
mosexualité en savoir, le passage de l'objectalité paranoïaque à l'ob- 
jectivité scientifique" [the transformation of homosexuality into 
knowledge, the passage from paranoid objectality to scientific objec- 
tivity].38 She views this as a successfully transformed paranoid delu- 
sion, citing Freud as cited by Lacan: "J'ai réussi là où le paranoïaque 
échoue" [I have succeeded where the paranoiac fails] .39 For Kant, suc- 
cess is gained in transcending this impasse to knowledge by restricting 
cognition to a description of the limits of internal and the absence of 
external intuitions. Kant's solution is also an Aufhebung of the confin- 
ing circularity of this libidinal dynamic. The superordinate position 
assures prophylaxis in the perpetuation of the philosopher's homo- 
social game. 
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David-Ménarďs somewhat reductive algorithm of paranoia should 
not be used to seek out homophobia in Kant's discourse. This would 
be a fool's errand, both in view of Kant's progressive individualist ide- 
ologies and of the fact that homosexuality was not a discursive concept 
in the eighteenth century. The value of this psychodynamic model lies 
in its utility for analyzing a particular idiom of interplay among the 
heterosocial, the homosocial, and the political and for illuminating a 
subtly gendered Kantian body politic. In Kant's treatment of male jeal- 
ousy, the repeated representation of woman as continually seeking 
sexual liaisons with men contains traces of erotic fascination that are 
repressed, negated, and projected onto the feminine. This generates 
spheres of interaction that distance and contain the feminine but dis- 
tance and privilege the masculine. These would be, respectively, the pri- 
vate and public spheres. 
In the essay on enlightenment, Kant's discussion of the private and 
public spheres argues that not everyone should call established prac- 
tices into question. There must be, for the sake of order, a division be- 
tween those who openly question and those who obey (8:37). Thus 
Kant differentiates between the unrestricted public (öffentlich) and 
the restricted private (privat) uses of reason. Their primary metaphors 
are, respectively, the scholar before his reading public and the obedi- 
ent civil servant. A closer reading reveals, however, that the private 
sphere is actually a condensation of many undesirable elements from 
which the philosopher unbound seeks to distance himself.40 
Privat refers to the private as opposed to the public, to the home (as 
in home phone number, home address, etc.) and to one's intimate 
and sexual life as well, connotations supported by the application of 
the term häuslich [domestic, literally house-like] (8:38) to this sphere. 
The private sphere has personal, emotional, and sexual connotations 
that are excluded from the realm of reason and enlightenment. It is 
"sehr enge eingschränkt" (8:37) [very narrowly restricted, literally 
boxed-in' (8:37), a Mechanism and a Maschine , and consists of passive 
Glieder, a term that can mean members, bodily parts, family members, 
and sexual organs. The singular form Glied is also a common trope for 
penis and appears here in the phrase passives Glied , echoing the emas- 
culated condition of the unenlightened. This is a regulated sphere for 
the control of contaminating elements, e.g. the unenlightened, the fa- 
milial, and the sexual. 
In a recent study of enlightenment in Kant, Jane Flax41 illuminates 
a "gendered geography"42 and "gendered dichotomies"43 in Kant's 
construction of the public and private spheres. Flax holds that the pri- 
vate sphere is associated with femininity and domesticity: "The power 
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of domestication (woman) is so great that its overcoming requires the 
counterforce of an entirely different sphere: the public world ... in 
this account autonomy is understood as the opposite of connection, 
walking alone, not holding someone's hand. Good guardians enable 
us to grow up and leave home/childhood, but to do so they must have 
access to the public world."44 The public sphere emerged by an act of 
mitosis, by splitting off from the private sphere. It is within the public 
sphere, an immune center, that the Kantian subject is located. For Stal- 
lybrass and White, the emergence of the eighteenth century man of 
reason within the public sphere is a gesture of independence and im- 
munity from contaminating realms: "A 'neutral,' 'middling,' 'demo- 
cratic,' 'rational' subject was laboriously constructed by a rejection of 
all specific and particular domains."45 'This refined public sphere oc- 
cupied the centre. That is to say, it carved out a domain between the 
realm of kings and the world of the alley-ways and taverns, and it did 
so by forcing together the high and the low as contaminated equiva- 
lents."46 The enlightened male subject is thus located in a position in- 
dependent of and superordinate to the domestic and feminine. This 
effects a monosexual dialogue, a forum of unbinding and coinciden- 
tal communication among autonomous male subjects, each speaking 
"als Gelehrter . . . vor dem ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt" [as a scholar 
before the entire public of the literate world] (8:37). In this state, one 
"genießt einer uneingeschränkten Freiheit, sich seiner eigenen Ver- 
nunft zu bedienen und in seiner eigenen Person zu sprechen" [enjoys 
an unlimited freedom to serve oneself of one's reason and to speak 
in one's own person] (8:38) . This is the published public sphere, that 
cleared frontier, esexualized and defeminized, for open debate among 
individuated and decentered men at great and respected distance. 
The construction of the public sphere is founded upon dichotomies 
that display hierarchical privileging. They do not, however, consist of 
mutually exclusive and independent entities but betray a submerged 
fascination, a repressed desire for the other characteristic of antinomi- 
cal discourses. The achievement of this idiom of enlightenment is thus 
marked by the persistence of abstractions and generalizations in the 
service of binomial reasoning, which reduces indeterminate fields of 
inquiry to dyadic clashes and poses questions as if bifurcated a priori. 
This bifurcation engenders gratuitous gendering and essentialist gen- 
eralizations about behavior that affix the metaphors feminine and mas- 
culine to undesirable and desirable character traits respectively. This 
is a transference of libidinal dynamics, a remapping of submerged ma- 
trices of eroticism onto the matrix of cognition, a reprocessing by 
mechanisms of denial and displacement. The transformation of sexu- 
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ality into knowledge, even into knowledge that is arguably the cogni- 
tive kingpin of enlightened egali tarianism, retains traces of an archaic 
dynamic that privilege certain discourses over others. Paradoxically, 
however, these traces also betray ambivalences that problematize the 
polarities of dualistic thinking themselves: e.g. the simultaneous sup- 
pression and desire of the feminine and the fact that the male is the 
preferred other, but only at a distance and within a deregulated public 
sphere. 
Kantian Enlightenment is a clearing up (Aufklärung) that involves 
simultaneous disambiguation and decontamination. This clearing up 
is effected by a bifurcation into sterile (public) and contaminated (pri- 
vate) spheres and by a sublimation of the self into the former, a sub- 
limation that is also a making sublime. The private sphere is constituted 
out of debris rejected in the process of self-cleansing: the organic, the 
uterine, the feminine, and the masses, as well as their surplus mean- 
ings. An associative network of metonymies and condensations main- 
tains the cohesion of these diverse elements in the private sphere, 
which is regulated by inversion, displacement, and denial of authori- 
tarian structures. These mechanisms serve to obscure the presence of 
some persistent irritants, unintended stowaways on the project of 
enlightenment. 
Notes 
1 . Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979) ,8. Kantianism 
is located within a larger tradition that Rorty refers to as a "Cartesian-Kantian pattern" 
that is "an attempt to escape from history - an attempt to find non-historical conditions 
of any possible historical development" (9).Even within the linguistic urn, this gesture 
has remained largely intact: "This emphasis on language . . . does not essentially change 
the Cartesian-Kantian problematic, and thus does not give philosophy a new self-image. 
For analytic philosophy is still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral 
framework forinquiry, and thus for all of culture" (8). For a feminist discussion fthe 
gendering of this mentality, see Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley, 
1978) and Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA, 1982). 
2. Women Studies Abstracts lists only eight gender-oriented inquiries into Kant be- 
tween 1974 and 1994. The Philosopher's Index lists over three thousand inquiries into Kant 
in toto in the same period. 
3. An appreciation of these lements inKant's discourse can only be effected by 
reading the German sources, for it is perhaps the reliance on English translations, which 
were themselves troped by the ideologies and secondary revisions ofthe past, that has 
partially hindered the revisionist reception of Kant. 
4. Immanuel Kant, Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung ? in Kants Werke. 
Akademie-Textausgabe (Berlin,1968), 8:33-42. This edition isan exact mechanical photo- 
reproduction of the first nine volumes of the standard Kants gesammelte Schriften , publish- 
ed by the Königliche Preussische Akademie derWissenschaften (Berlin, 1902-38) . Both editions 
have identical volume and page numbers. All subsequent passages from Kant are referred 
to only by volume and page number; the translations aremy own. 
1 88 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
5. "Answer to the Question, What is Enlightenment?," trans. H. B. Nisbet, in Kant's 
Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge, 1970), 54-60. 
6. Even Nisbeťs paginal header is only "What isEnlightenment?" The dominant 
reference to the essay as being a question is remarkably ahistorical. The December 1783 
issue of the Berlinische Monatschrift included an invitation to readers to indeed answer the 
question "Was ist Aufklärung?," to which Kant, Moses Mendelsohn, and others re- 
sponded. Kant's essay is, in fact, an answer to the question posed in that journal. 
7. Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York, 1984). 
8. Thomas McCarthy, 'The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt 
School," Political Theory 18:3 (1990):437-69, esp. 451. 
9. Selbstverschuldet contains the reflexive selbst (self) and the adjective verschuldet, 
which indicates indebtedness, literally an owing of money. Verschuldete built upon the root 
Schuld , which means both debt and guilt. 
1 0. See Willi Goetschel, Constructing Critique: Kant 'sWriting as Critical Praxis (Durham, 
1994) . Goetschel views Kant's statement as not a legitimation, but instead a "small ironic 
barb at Frederick the Great" ( 149) .This observation fits well into Goetschel's attempt to 
demonstrate the complex literary nature of Kant's discourse. He does not discuss, 
however, that his could also be, ironically, an invocation fhegemony. 
11. See Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, (Leipzig, 1873), 5:451- 
454. Grimm first designates Keimmth e Latin equivalents germen [embryo] and pullula 
[sprout] and sees it as that which first grows from a seed (Kern) . Grimm also designates 
the verb form keimen as germinare [to sprout forth] and pullulare [to sprout]. The first 
New High German data cited by Grimm are eighteenth century examples from Schiller, 
Goethe, and Kant. 
12. Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca, 
1986), 191. 
13. Stallybrass and White, 193. 
14. The philosophical conflation fnature and woman has been illuminated by 
Susan Bordo, 'The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," Signs 11:3 (1986): 439-56. See 
also Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity (Albany, 1987). See also Robin Schott, Cognition 
and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm (Boston, 1988). 
15. For a discussion fKant's resistance toevolutionary theory, see A. O. Lovejoy, 
"Kant and Evolution," in Forerunners of Darwin 1745-1859, ed.Bentley Glass (Baltimore, 
1959), 173-207. 
16. Georg Forster, Noch etwas über die Menschenraßen, in Georg Forsters Werke (Berlin, 
1991), 8:130-56. 
17. Lovejoy, 196. 
18. Forster, 143. 
19. Forster, 141. 
20. Forster, 142. 
21. The word is a victim of a popular folk etymology that suppresses the historical 
homophony between dei' Mund and die mund, which meant a form of protection a d 
disappeared from the language after the middle ages, thus freeing the usure of der Mund 
to slip into the semantic field of mündig (mature) and produce oral resonances. 
22. The conventional English translations of tutelage and/or immaturity for Un- 
mündigkeit are remarkably unresonant and eclipse association with the oral; this applies 
as well to the choice of guardian for Voimund, which is also metonymically insufficient, 
but which properly conveys dependency. 
23. The very last oral reference b fore the public sphere discussion mentions the 
'Vormünder, dieselbst aller Aufklärung unfähig sind" [guardians, who themselves are
BONFIGLIO- PRIVATE REASON(S) AND PUBLIC SPHERES 189 
incapable of any and all enlightenment] (8:36) . The first oral reference after the public 
sphere discussion mentions again "daß die Vormünder . . . selbst wieder unmündig sein 
sollen" [that he guardians themselves should remain immature] (8:38). Kant does, 
indeed, ostensibly present this ituation as undesirable. His repetitive preoccupation with 
it, however, reveals a submerged fascination. Again, in Kant's discourse, the undesirable 
bears the imprint of desire. 
24. Goetschel uses the term "Publicizing Enlightenment" to characterize the special 
relationship among reason, publication, and enlightenment in Kant (144-66). 
25. The earlier justification of this bifurcation as an actual respectful valorization of 
the feminine has been analyzed in Sarah Kofman, "The Economy of Respect: Kant and 
Respect for Women," Social Research 49 (Summer 1982):383-404. Kofman says, "respect 
is a negative sentiment. In opposition to love, which attracts, it implies a repulsion, the 
distancing of that which fascinates; or better, it implies quasi-simultaneous attraction and 
repulsion: that he object which fascinates and seduces is found concealed and at the 
same time discovered" (394). See also Heidemarie B nnent, Galanterie und Verachtung: 
Eine phi losophie-geschi chtliche Untersuchung z r Stellung der Frau in Gesellschaft und Kultur 
(Frankfurt, 1985). 
26. Paul de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," in Hermeneutics: Questions 
and Prospects , ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst, 1984), 121-44. 
27. De Man, 138. 
28. De Man, 144. 
29. De Man, 144. 
30. Kant in de Man, 133. 
31. De Man tends to see only the impossibility of sublime representation, a reading 
equally applicable to many neo-platonic texts, especially those in the German tradition. 
Such texts should really offer little resistance to a deconstructionist reading with marx- 
ist/ materialist echoes. 
32. See Olga Valbuena, "The 'Charming Distinction : Ur-teil as the En-gendering of 
Reason in Kant's Thought," Genders 4 (Spring 1989):87-102. Valbuena has aptly demon- 
strated the considerable thematic continuity of both of the texts on the aesthetic. She 
connects he representation of the beautiful and the sublime with the distancing from 
nature and privileging of reason: "In contrast tothe beautiful, which actually connects 
the beholder with alterity, with nature, the sublime wrenches him from this feeling of 
continuity, of being at one with the sensible. For that reason, he who experiences the 
sublime will . . . need to call upon supersensible reason to introduce a higher form of 
harmony in the subject" (94) . 
33. Kant does refer to this trade in women as malevolent (boshaft) (2:237), which 
leads Ursulajauch, in Immanuel Kant zur Geschlechterdifferenz (Wi n, 1988) ,66, to conclude 
that Kant does not approve of this and only uses it to make his point about generalizable 
beauty. Jauch does not observe that his instance of deflection a d denial could actually 
facilitate a palatable representation of commodification. 
34. Jauch, 38-45. 
35. Sigmund Freud, Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten, in Gesammelte Werke 
(Frankfurt, 1960) 6:1-269. 
36. Sigmund Freud, "Über einige neurotische Mechanismen beiEifersucht, Para- 
noia, und Homosexualität" in Gesammelte Werke (Frankfurt, 1960), 13:193-207. 
37. Monique David-Ménard, "Laraison philosophique est-elle homosexuelle? soit: 
Kant avec Freud," in Philosophie et Culture, ed.Venant Cauchy (Montreal, 1988), 5:77-85. 
38. David-Ménard, 84. 
39. David-Ménard, 82. 
190 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
40. See Foucault, 36-37. Even Foucault takes this distinction at face value. He does 
not seek to unearth, inthis binary distinction, a discourse ofpower that subjugates certain 
segments of the population. 
41. Jane Flax, Disputed, Subjects : E says on Psychoanalysis, Pol tics, and Philosophy (New 
York, 1993). 
42. Flax, 75. 
43. Flax, 76. 
44. Flax, 77. 
45. Stallybrass and White, 199. 
46. Stallybrass and White, 109. 
